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Reforming German Civil Servant Pensions:  
Funding Policy, Investment Strategy, and Intertemporal Risk Budgeting 
 
Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Ralph Rogalla 
 
Throughout the developed world, public sector employees have traditionally been 
promised a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) defined benefit (DB) pension plan. In such a system, 
current pensions are paid through taxes or contributions made by the working generation. 
These systems, however, face increasing financial difficulties, since a shrinking working-age 
group has to support more and more retirees. If these developments continue and the systems 
remain unaltered, civil servants pension benefits sooner or later will have to be reduced or 
contributions increased, in either case requiring unpopular political decisions. At the same 
time, it is often argued that moving public employee pension plans toward funded systems 
may offer a resort to the deteriorating financial situation of these plans. The rationale behind 
this argument is that accumulating assets and investing them in the capital markets will 
strengthen the rights of plan participants, increase transparency, and might generate enhanced 
returns, which in turn help to reduce civil servants’ pension costs. This chapter explores the 
feasibility of implementing a funded pension system for German civil servants who have been 
promised an unfunded defined benefit (DB) plan which faces future shortfalls.   
In some countries, civil servant pension plans are well funded, as in the United States 
or the Netherlands (ABP 2006, Mitchell et al. 2001). But German civil servant DB plans are 
promised benefits related to final salary and service years, yet few of these promises are 
backed by assets. As political decisionmakers have grown more conscious of the economic 
costs of public pensions, some action has already been taken. The German state of Rhineland-
Palatinate was the first to introduce a fully funded pension scheme for newly recruited civil 
servants in 1996, which is currently endowed with 20-30 percent of the salaries of those 
covered by the plan. The state of Saxony followed along these lines and introduced a 
comparable scheme in 2005, which fully covers all employees that joined civil service since 
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1997. Both states essentially restrict their funds’ investment universe to government bonds, 
and thereby forego the opportunity to improve the funds’ financial situation by earning higher 
returns in equity markets. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence on international 
public pension plans’ investment strategies. For instance, Dutch-based ABP, the pension fund 
for those employed by the government and in education, only invests around 40 percent of 
plan assets into fixed-income securities, including a substantial fraction of corporate bonds 
(ABP 2007). Similar results are reported for the United States, where state pension plans on 
average only invest about one third of their assets in bonds and other debt instruments 
(Wilshire 2007). 
As German civil servants pensions are far from being fully funded, and since in those 
cases where plans have at least some assets, investment policies are particularly conservative, 
more efforts need to be made to provide political decisionmakers with reliable information on 
the opportunities and risks associated with moving toward a funded pension system for civil 
servants.  To this end, this chapter studies the implications of partially prefunding the civil 
servants pension plan in the German state of Hesse. We introduce a hypothetical additional 
tax-sponsored pension fund for currently active civil servants, similar to those already 
introduced in Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony. Contributions paid into the fund are invested 
in the capital markets and investment returns are used to alleviate the burden of increasing 
pension liabilities. Based on stochastic simulations of future pension plan asset development, 
we estimate the expectation as well as the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) of pension costs. 
These are then evaluated in an effort to determine the optimal asset allocation that controls 
worst-case risks while still offering relief with respect to expected economic costs of 
providing the promised pensions. 
This study extends prior work by Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2008) in several 
ways. First, we give a more detailed overview on future structural changes in the civil service 
population, which will contribute to a further deterioration of the public pension plan’s 
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financial situation. Second, we introduce a more sophisticated stochastic asset model of the 
vector autoregression variety which includes stocks, bonds, and real estate as an alternative 
asset class available to the plan manager. Finally, we study the intertemporal risk and return 
patterns of the suggested investment policy for current and future taxpayers. 
In what follows, we first offer a concise description of the characteristics of the 
German civil service pension plan. Next we evaluate future public plan obligations for 
taxpayers in a non-stochastic context and derive the payroll related deterministic contribution 
rate that is able to finance accruing pension benefits in the long run. Drawing on these results, 
we take a plan manager’s perspective to determine reasonable investment strategies for 
accumulating plan assets within a stochastic asset/liability framework. The final section 
summarizes findings and their implications for managing funded public sector pension plans 
in Germany. 
 
German Civil Service Pension Plan Design  
Public sector employees constitute about 14 percent of the German workforce, 
classified into two groups: public employees and civil servants. The legal status of the roughly 
three million public employees is based on private sector law, while that of the 1.4 million 
civil servants is codified in public law. Initially, the rights and duties of civil servants were 
codified in the 1792 Prussian General Code, and with some modifications, the basic 
characteristics of this system are still in force and manifested after WWII in the German 
constitution (Gillis, 1968).  Key components include the fact that civil servants commit to 
work for public sector tasks for life, they have no right to strike, and they are subject to 
special disciplinary rules. In exchange for this commitment, the government provides them 
with an appropriate salary depending on specific career paths, offers particular pre-entry 
training, and supplies lifelong health care, disability, and pension benefits. In contrast to the 
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United States, the legal status, the salary packages, and the retirement benefits for German 
civil servants are quite homogenous at the federal, state, and local levels. 
At retirement, German civil servants receive a noncontributory, tax-sponsored, and 
cost-of-living-adjusted defined benefit (DB) type lifetime annuity1 which depends on final 
salary, the number of pensionable years of service in the public sector, and the retirement age. 
The noncontributory plan for civil servants comes at the price of significantly lower gross 
salaries compared to other public sector workers with equivalent qualifications. German civil 
servants are neither offered complementary occupational pension plans nor covered by the 
national social security system.2 Hence, their retirement benefits are higher than those of 
private sector workers who may be eligible for social security as well as supplementary 
occupational pension benefits (Heubeck and Rürup 2000).  
Some argue that the generosity of civil servant pensions serves as partial compensation 
for their lack of portability, since accrued pension benefits are substantially if the worker were 
to leave public employ.3 Naturally, this substantially reduces turnover, particularly among 
older civil servants with long tenure. On the other hand, if a civil servant were to change jobs 
within the public sector, he would be permitted to remain in the same pension plan (even 
when moving from one state to another).  From the plan sponsor’s perspective, the relatively 
generous but nonportable DB pension scheme serves as a useful instrument for attracting, 
recruiting, and retaining a highly skilled and stable workforce. 
Of late, however, German public pension plan generosity has been substantially 
reduced.  In 2003, a new pension benefit formula was introduced that reduced the retirement 
benefit formula from 1.875 percent of final salary per year of service down to 1.79375 
                                                 
1 To be precise, the benefits of retired civil servants are adjusted according to the general salary increase of 
active civil servants.  
2 Civil servants are exempt from unemployment insurance and the state covers a certain fraction of health care 
expenses for civil servants and their families. These fractions range from 50% - 85%, depending on family 
status, number of children, and state. See Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003). 
3 If, for example, a civil servant were to quit service and take a job in the private sector, he would sacrifice about 
50 percent of his accrued pension claims.  In this case, the state pays to the national social security system the 
employee’s foregone employer contributions. 
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percent.4 After a maximum of 40 pensionable service years, a retiring civil servant is 
promised a maximum replacement rate of 71.75 percent. A surviving spouse receives 
survivorship benefits of 55 percent (formerly 60 percent) of the deceased civil servant’s 
pension. Orphans receive 20 percent and half-orphans 12 percent. 
Current pensioners, who retired under the old formula with pension benefits worth 75 
percent of their final salaries, will also be affected by the benefit cut. For several years, their 
post-retirement benefit increases will be marginally reduced, until their replacement rate will 
be cut to the same 71.75 percent. The nominal pension paid to a retired civil servant will 
nonetheless increase over time. 
In the past, civil servants’ standard retirement age has been 65, though they may retire 
as young as age 63 with a reduction of 0.3 percentage points per month. Special provisions for 
public safety workers with physically demanding jobs like police officers or fire fighters 
allow for retirement at earlier ages without a benefit cut. In mid 2007, however, several states 
as well as the federal government have followed Germany’s social security system in moving 
gradually to 67 as the normal retirement age. 
 
Deterministic Valuation of Future Public Pension Obligations 
Next we analyze the actuarial status of the civil servants’ pension plan in the state of 
Hesse.5  Our prior research has found that already-accrued public pension liabilities for the 
state are on the order of 150 percent of current explicit state debt (Mitchell, Maurer, and 
Rogalla 2008); this analysis assumes that these claims already accumulated will be financed 
from other sources. In this section, we conduct a deterministic actuarial valuation of pension 
liabilities that will accrue in the future to existing employees and new hires over the next 50 
                                                 
4 To compensate for this cut in pension benefits, civil servants are allowed to (voluntarily) invest up to 4% of 
their salary (with a ceiling of 2.100 p.a.) into tax sponsored personal retirement account also known as “Riester 
accounts;”  for details see Maurer and Schlag (2003). 
5 Being part of former West Germany, Hesse’s civil service population appears to be rather representative of the 
approximately 1.5 million active (which is about 4.5% of the German workforce) and 900,000 retired civil 
servants in Germany as a whole. This section draws on Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2008). 
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years.6  We draw on a datafile provided by the Hessian Statistical Office which contains 
demographic and economic information on more than 100,000 active and retired civil servants 
in Hesse as of the beginning of 2004, including their age, sex, marital status, line of service 
(for active civil servants), and salary/pension payments.  On average, 45 percent of the active 
workers are female, the average salary (in 2004) is EUR 39,000, and it is a relatively old 
group, averaging age 45. 
Figure 1 depicts the age distribution of the sample of active employees. This 
distribution peaks for employees in their late 40s and early 50s. Thus, in 15 to 20 years’ time, 
a significant group of civil servants will retire in a concentrated fashion, and it will result in a 
jump in required pension payments. At the same time, there are relatively few active civil 
servants in their late 50s or early 60s, a pattern attributable to generous early benefits in the 
past. 
Figure 1 here 
Demographic Assumptions. In what follows, we project pension accruals of future 
generations of employees. Our approach is to project the time path of age and salary for all 
civil servants through time (we assume that the marital status remains constant). When a 
position becomes vacant, a new civil servant is assumed to be recruited (with equal 
probability of being male or female); the new worker’s age is assumed to be the average age 
of entering civil service, accounting for average time spent on position-related education or 
other types of public service that will be credited as pensionable years in civil service. The 
salary of the newly hired civil servant is assumed to be in line with the age-related 
remuneration for the position; the marital status is assumed to be that of the previous position 
holder. Since turnover other than retirement is virtually nil we assume no employee turnover 
prior to retirement; hence we do not account for early retirement, disability benefits, or 
dependents’ benefits due to death in service. In terms of mortality projections, we use those 
                                                 
6 This time horizon could be easily extended, but after 50 years, all active workers will be fully included in the 
new funded system.  
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derived by Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2008) who have prepared mortality tables specific 
to retired German civil servants based on a dataset for the state of Hesse covering the period 
1994 to 2004. They show that retired civil servants tend to enjoy lower mortality than the 
overall population. Throughout this study we also employ these tables, accounting for 
decreasing future mortality rates according to the trend functions published by the German 
Association of Actuaries (see DAV 2004). We also assume that the pension reforms are fully 
implemented, that is, maximum benefits only amount to 71.75 percent of final salary and the 
retirement age is 67. 
Economic Assumptions. Three interrelated economic factors significantly influence the 
valuation of pension plan liabilities: anticipated inflation, expected salary growth rates, and 
investment returns on plan assets (c.f. Hustead and Mitchell 2001). While Germany has 
experienced only moderate inflation over the last decades, it remains an important factor for 
the valuation of future pension cash flows. For this reason, and because salaries as well as 
pensions tend to be maintained in real terms, this study therefore uses real financial values 
and investment returns throughout.  
An issue that looms large in the public pension plan arena is what discount rate one 
should in valuing future promised benefits (Waring, 2008).  Naturally, the discount rate 
selected directly influences both the reported pension liability and the contribution rate 
required to fund the promises.  The current debate coalesces around whether public plans 
should use an actuarial versus an economic concept of liabilities.7  Many actuaries select a 
discount rate which reflects projected (or historical) asset returns; accordingly, if a portion of 
the pension fund is held in equities, the selected discount rate will include an ex ante risk 
premium which may not, in fact, be realized ex post.  This approach also tends to downweight 
future liabilities and upweight the benefits of investing in stock. By contrast, if returns are 
lower than expected, future generations of taxpayers may end up bearing the investment risk, 
                                                 
7 See Blake (2006), Gold (2003), and also Waring (2008). 
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if actual returns fall below the expected rates. This strategy is intended to smooth contribution 
rates required over time.  
By contrast, many economists contend that a public plan should use a (nearly) risk-
free rate on government bonds to compute liabilities, as this reflects the state’s financing 
costs. We argue that the riskless interest rate must be used for reporting the actuarial present 
value of pension promises for accounting purposes and for solvency planning, as well as for 
setting the contribution rates. Our simulation assumes that this real risk free interest rate is 
three percent for the base case;8 we also evaluate an alternative set of results with a real 
interest rate of 1.5 percent.  Using a risk-free government bond rate is consistent with the 
often-recommended practice of nearly fully matching public plan assets and liabilities. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the public entity must, of necessity, automatically invest 
entirely in government bonds. Instead, it might be appropriate to invest at least part of the 
pension portfolio in more risky equities, depending on the plan sponsor’s risk preferences.  
 
Projected Future Benefits for Current and Future Civil Servants 
In order to move the public DB pension plan toward funding, assets need to be built up 
and invested in the capital markets to back the accruing liabilities. Consequently, the plan 
sponsor’s foremost task is to assess what contributions are required to finance the benefits 
based on pension liability patterns specific to the plan. As pension benefits for Hessian civil 
servants are calculated as a percentage of final salary times years of service, the normal cost 
of the plan (i.e. the cost accrued in each year supposing actuarial assumptions are realized) is 
determined according to the aggregate level percentage of payroll method. Total projected 
pension plan costs are stated as a percentage of active members’ overall payroll (McGill et al. 
2005); we derive the actuarial present value of future pension benefit obligations (PBO) based 
                                                 
8 The difference between the average nominal par yield of long term German government bonds and the average 
inflation rate for the post-WWII period is about 4 percent. Inflation protected bonds in the Eurozone currently 
yield about 2 percent. This market is currently not well developed for government bonds (especially those with 
long durations) which supports the assumption of a real interest rate of 3%. 
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on future salaries and service years over the next 50 years (2004-53), evolving our initial 
population through time in line with the dynamics discussed above. We determine the value 
of future pension benefits for active and future civil servants based on the projected benefit 
obligation (PBO) formula: 
 
( )∑ −+
⋅⋅⋅
=
i
Age
iii
ir
aS
PBO 67
6767
1
793751 ,,. τ , (1) 
where (for each civil servant i of Agei) τi is the number of service years as of retirement, S67,i 
is the (expected) salary at retirement age 67, ia ,67 is the immediate pension annuity factor, and 
r is the discount rate. After 50 years, we assume that the plan is terminated and conduct a 
discontinuance valuation. 
The relative amount of the present values of pension liabilities to salary payments 
represents the deterministic annual contribution rate as a percentage of the payroll required to 
fund future pension promises.9 In our non-stochastic analysis, we presume that these 
contributions are paid into the pension plan at the beginning of each year. Plan assets are 
invested in the capital markets and earn a fixed (i.e. non-stochastic) return equal to the rate at 
which plan liabilities are discounted for valuation purposes. Table 1 summarizes the results 
for our base case with a real discount rate of 3 percent (Column 1) as well as for our 
alternative set-up, i.e. a discount rate of 1.5 percent (Column 2). The present values of current 
workers’ projected pension liabilities and salaries are reported along with the ratio of the 
present value of pension costs to salaries and, therefore, the notional contribution rate required 
to finance the pension promises.  
Table 1 here 
In our benchmark case with the 3 percent discount rate, the present value of future 
pension liabilities comes to € 20.8 billion (Row 1, Column 1), whereas salary payments have 
                                                 
9 As noted above, we set aside pension benefits of current retirees as well as those already accumulated by 
currently active civil servants and assume that these will be covered by some other financing arrangement. Thus, 
only future benefit accruals by active civil servants will be covered by this scheme. 
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a present value of € 111.5 billion (Row 2, Column 1). The ratio of present values representing 
the average required contribution rate is 18.7 percent of salaries for each future year (Row 3, 
Column 1). This comes close to the contribution rates for the civil servants’ pension plan of 
Rhineland-Palatinate, which range from 20 to 30 percent depending on service level. It comes 
at no surprise that these results are highly sensitive to the discount rate applied. A lower 
discount rate increases both the present value of pension liabilities as well as the present value 
of salary payments. However, as pension liabilities have a longer duration than salary 
payments, contribution rates increase with falling discount rates. In our alternative setting 
with a real discount rate of 1.5 percent, the present value of pension liabilities more than 
doubles to € 44.8 billion while discounted salary payments only increase by less than 50 
percent to € 149.3 billion (Rows 1 and 2, Column 2). Hence, the contribution rate rises to 30 
percent (Row 3, Column 2). 
 
Pension Plan Management in a Stochastic Environment 
Uncertain capital market returns on pension plan assets are of major concern to DB 
pension plan sponsors. While market gains may reduce required contributions and therefore 
overall plan costs, excessive investment losses can also require a plan sponsor to make 
supplementary contributions in an effort to recover from funding deficits. Selecting an 
adequate asset allocation for plan funds is therefore of utmost importance to the plan manager.  
Therefore in this section we evaluate the public plan sponsor’s decision-making process, to 
identify a reasonable plan asset allocation in a world with uncertain investment returns. This 
requires formulating an intertemporal objective function guiding tradeoffs between capital 
market risk and returns, as well as between supplementary contributions and cost savings. 
Plan Design, Pension Manager Objectives, and Asset/Liability Modeling. We follow the 
approach of Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2008) who minimize the worst-case total cost of 
running plan over a future long-term time horizon. The funded pension scheme we model is 
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designed as follows: at the beginning of every period t, regular contributions RCt are paid into 
the pension plan by the plan sponsor. These contributions are determined by a fixed 
contribution rate CR of 18.7 percent of the current payroll for all civil servants participating in 
the plan, as derived in the previous section. Plan funds are used to pay for pension payments 
due at time t, while the remaining assets are invested in the capital markets.  
At the end of every period, the plan manager has to analyze the plan’s funding 
situation. Depending on the funding ratio, defined as the fraction of the current projected 
benefit obligation that is covered by current plan assets, solvency rules might require 
additional funds to be paid into the plan to recover funding deficits. By contrast, substantial 
overfunding might allow future contribution rates to be reduced. Specifically, in case the 
funding ratio in any period drops below 90 percent, immediate supplementary contributions 
SCt are required to reestablish a funding ratio of 100 percent. If, on the other hand, fund assets 
exceed fund liabilities by more than 20 percent, CR will be cut by 50 percent. In case the 
funding ratio even rises above 150 percent, no further regular contributions will be required 
from the plan sponsor until the funding level decreases again. At the end of our projection 
horizon, we assume the plan is frozen and all liabilities are transferred to a private insurer 
together with assets to fund them.  
The plan manager’s investment policy aims at generating sufficient returns in order to 
reduce overall pension plan costs. At the same time, he tries to keep capital market 
fluctuations and thereby worst-case plan costs under control. Hence, the plan sponsor is 
interested in identifying the optimal allocation of pension funds across three broad asset 
classes: an equity index fund, a government bond index fund, and a real estate index fund.10 
Specifically, we assume that the plan sponsor seeks to minimize the worst-case cost of 
running the plan, specified by the Conditional Value at Risk at the 5 percent level of the 
                                                 
10 We assume investments in index funds to prevent the state from systematically influencing asset prices. 
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stochastic present value of total pension costs (TPC).11 The distribution of total discounted 
pension costs is derived from running a 10,000 iteration Monte Carlo simulation. Based on 
this, we identify the optimal asset allocation x fixed at the beginning of the projection 
horizon.12  
Total pension costs are the sum of regular contributions RC and supplementary 
contributions SC made by the plan sponsor. All payments by the plan sponsor are discounted 
at the fixed real interest rate r, which reflects the government’s financing cost. Thus, the 
optimization problem with respect to the vector of investment weights x (i.e. the fraction of 
assets invested in bonds, stocks, and real estate) is specified by: 
 
( )
( ) ⎟
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The 5%-Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) is defined as the expected present value of total 
pension cost under the condition that its realization is greater than the Value at Risk (VaR) for 
that level, i.e.: 
 
 ( ) ( )( )TPCVaRTPCTPCETPCCVaR %5%5 | >= . (3) 
The CVaR framework as a measure of risk is in many ways superior to the commonly-used 
VaR measure, defined as ( ) αα => VaRTPCP , i.e. the costs that will not be exceeded with a 
given probability of (1- α) percent. In particular, the CVaR focuses not only on a given 
percentile of a loss distribution, but also accounts for the magnitude of losses in the 
distributional tails beyond this percentile.13  
                                                 
11 For a comparable objective function using the Value at Risk see Albrecht et al. (2006). 
12 We deliberately do not dynamically optimize investment weights and contribution rates over time. While this 
might by appealing from a theoretical perspective, political decision makers will most likely be unable to 
implement this in practice. Moreover, empirical evidence on pension plan asset allocation suggests that 
investment weights are rather constant in real-world pension schemes (see Haberman et al. 2003). 
13 For a detailed discussion of the advantages of the CVaR over the more widely acknowledged VaR see, e.g., 
Artzner et al. (1997, 1999) and Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002). 
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We argue that pension benefits as a rule should be covered by regular plan 
contributions. Hence, supplementary contributions ought to be required only as a last resort. 
In case a plan sponsor is often asked to make supplementary contributions, regular 
contribution rates are likely to be insufficient. To discourage making too few regular 
contributions, we include a penalty factor ξ for supplementary contributions. Thus, if one unit 
of supplementary contributions is required to recover a funding deficit, then (1 + ξ) units are 
accounted for as plan costs. This penalty can also be interpreted as the additional costs in 
excess of the risk free rate of financing the required supplementary contributions, countering 
the notion that public monies paid into public pension plans are “free” money.  
At the same time, measures need to be taken to discourage overfunding the plan 
significantly. The sponsor might find it appealing to excessively short government bonds and 
invest the proceeds into the pension plan in an effort to “cash in” on the equity premium. To 
this end, we disallow funds being physically transferred out of the plan; the minimum 
contribution rate in any single period is zero. In case plan assets exceed plan liabilities after 
plan termination, these funds are lost from the perspective of the plan manager as they are not 
accounted for as revenues in his objective function. Later we relax this assumption. 
Stochastic Asset Model. We model the long run stochastic dynamics of future returns on 
assets accumulated in the pension plan using a first-order vector autoregressive (VAR) model, 
which is widely used by practitioners as well as in the academic literature (Hoevenaars, 
Molenaar, and Steenkamp 2003; Campbell and Viceira 2002). The pension plan’s investment 
universe comprises broadly diversified portfolios of equities, bonds and real estate 
investments. Our asset model draws on the specification employed by Hoevenaars et al. 
(2008), who extend the models in Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003) as well as in Campbell 
and Viceira (2005) by including additional asset classes, in particular alternative investments 
like real estate, commodities, and hedge funds. Following the notation of Hoevenaars et al. 
(2008), let zt be the vector 
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that contains the real money market log return at time t (rm,t), the vector x1,t , which includes 
the excess returns of equities and bonds relative to rm,t (i.e. xi,t = ri,t - rm,t), the vector x2,t , 
which includes the excess return of real estate relative to rm,t, and a vector st describing state 
variables that predict rm,t, x1,t , and  x2,t. We include the nominal 3-months interest rate (rnom), 
the dividend-price ratio (dp), and the term spread (spr) as predicting variables.14 
While historical return data are easily available for traditional asset classes, this does 
not hold for alternative investments, like real estate in our case. Typically, return time series 
for these asset classes are comparably short. This imposes difficulties when trying to calibrate 
the model. The large number of parameters to be estimated can lead to these estimates being 
unreliable as data availability is insufficient. To resolve this problem, restrictions are being 
imposed on the VAR with respect to x2,t. In particular, we assume that x2,t has no dynamic 
feedback on the other variables. In other words, real estate returns are influenced by the 
returns on traditional asset classes and the predictor variables, while these in turn do not 
depend on the development of real estate returns. To this end, let yt be the vector 
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The dynamics of yt are assumed to follow an unrestricted VAR(1) according to 
 11 ++ ++= ttt Byay ε  (6) 
with εt+1 ~ N( 0 , Σεε ). The return on real estate investments are modeled according to  
 1211012 +++ +⋅+⋅+⋅+= ttttt xHyDyDcx η,, , (7) 
                                                 
14 The state variables included here are commonly used in the strategic asset allocation literature (see e.g. 
Campbell and Shiller (1988, 1991); Fama and French (1989); Campbell, Chan and Viceira (2003); Campbell and 
Viceira (2005); Cochrane (2005); Brandt and Santa-Clara (2006)). 
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with ηt+1 ~ N( 0 , σre ). The innovations εt+1 and ηt+1 are assumed to be uncorrelated, as 
contemporaneous interrelations are captured by D0. Based on this set-up and following 
Stambaugh (1997), we can then optimally exploit available data by estimating the unrestricted 
VAR (Equation 6) over the complete data sample and by using the smaller sample only for 
estimating the parameters in Equation 7. 
The unrestricted VAR model is calibrated to quarterly logarithmic return series 
starting in 1973:I and ending in 2007:I. The real money market return is the difference 
between the nominal log 3-months Euribor and inflation (Fibor is used for the time before 
Euribor was available). Log returns on equities and log dividend-price ratios draw on time 
series data for the DAX 30 – an index portfolio of German blue chips - provided by 
DataStream. We use the approach in Campbell and Viceira (2002) to derive return series for 
diversified bond portfolios. The bond return series rn,t+1 is constructed according to 
 ),( ,,,,, tntntntntn yyDyr −−= +−+−+ 11111 4
1  (8) 
employing 10 year constant maturity yields on German bonds, where yn,t = ln(1+Yn,t) is the n-
period maturity bond yield at time t. Dn,t is the duration, which can be approximated by 
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We approximate yn-1,t+1 by yn,t+1 assuming that the term structure is flat between maturities n-1 
and n,. As for equities, excess returns are calculated by subtracting the log money market 
return, xb,t = rn,t – rm,t. The yield spread is computed as the difference between the log 10-year 
zeros yield on German government bonds and the log 3-months Euribor, both provided by 
Deutsche Bundesbank. 
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Deriving reliable return time series for real estate as an asset class is difficult due to 
the peculiarities of property investments.15 In contrast to equity and bond indices, 
inhomogeneity, illiquidity, and infrequent trading in individual properties result in 
transaction-based real estate indices not being able to adequately describe the returns 
generated in these markets. Moreover, such price indices do not account for rental income, 
which constitutes a significant source of return on real estate investments. By contrast, it is 
comparably easy to construct indices that try to approximate the income on direct real estate 
investments by using the return on investing indirectly through traded property companies 
like real estate investment trusts (REITs). However, empirical evidence on these forms of 
indirect real estate investments suggests that they exhibit a more equity-like behavior.16 These 
indices are therefore a much less than perfect proxy for direct real estate investments (see 
Hoesli and MacGregor 2000). 
Appraisal-based indices, like the one this study draws on, are the most widely used 
representatives for real estate investments in the academic literature as well as among 
practitioners. These indices account for easy to sample continuous rental income as well as for 
returns from changes in property values, which are estimated through periodic appraisals by 
real estate experts. As individual properties’ values are usually estimated only once a year and 
due to the fact that there is no single valuation date for all properties, not every return 
observation in the index can be substantiated with a new and observation date consistent 
appraisal of the overall property portfolio underlying the index. Moreover, annual appraisals 
often draw significantly on prior valuations. Consequently, returns derived from appraisal-
based indices exhibit substantial serial correlation and low short term volatilities that 
understate the true volatility of real estate returns. Different methodologies have been 
suggested to reduce undue smoothing in real estate return time series, which subsequently will 
                                                 
15 For an extensive discussion of design and characteristics of real estate indices we refer to – among others – 
Albrecht and Maurer (2005, Ch. 14) and Hoesli and MacGregor (2000, Ch. 4). 
16 In a survey by Eichholtz (1997), correlations between common equities and property company shares range 
from 0.12 to 0.96. 
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exhibit more realistic levels of volatility.17 In this study we employ the approach developed by 
Blundell and Ward (1987) that suggests transforming the original (smoothed) return series 
according to: 
 111 −−
−
−
= t
t
t ra
a
a
r
r * , (10) 
where r*t represents the unsmoothed return in t and a the coefficient of first-order 
autocorrelation in the return time series. Under this transformation, expected returns remain 
constant, E(r*t) = E(rt), but the return standard deviation increases according to: 
 ( ) ( )
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−
= . (11) 
We rely on an appraisal-based index for a diversified property portfolio as elaborated in 
Maurer, Reiner and Sebastian (2003), which provides quarterly returns on German real estate 
back to January 1980.The index is a value weighted index constructed from the returns on 
German open-end real estate funds’ units. These fund units represent portfolios of direct real 
estate investments and liquid assets like money market deposits or short- to medium-term 
government bonds.18 The return on direct property investments is then approximated by 
subtracting from the funds’ returns their earnings resulting from investing in liquid assets. 
While our asset/liability model is run on a yearly basis, the VAR is calibrated to 
quarterly data, resulting in higher reliability of parameter estimates due to a higher number of 
available observations. Quarterly returns generated by the asset model are aggregated and 
parameters a, c, σre and Σεε are adapted so that the model’s simulated empirical return 
moments (see Table 2 and the Appendix) reflect those of annual historic returns.19  
                                                 
17 Other methods to unsmooth real estate return time series have been suggested by – among others – 
Firstenberg, Ross, and Zisler (1988), Ross and Zisler (1991), Fisher, Geltner, and Webb (1994), Geltner (1993) 
and Barkham and Geltner (1994). 
18 A thorough analysis of the institutional design of German open-end real estate funds, as well as their risk and 
return profile can be found in Maurer, Reiner, and Rogalla (2004).  
19 Mean real log returns on bonds in our time series come to almost 5 percent p.a. while equities only yield an 
excess return of 1.5 percent. We reduce expected bond returns to 4 percent, considering this to be more 
appropriate in the long term. 
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Table 2 here 
Optimal Asset Allocation under Stochastic Investment Returns. Next we derive the 
optimal investment strategy for plan assets assuming that the rate of regular contributions, CR, 
is fixed at a given ratio of projected benefit obligation to the present value of projected future 
salaries. From Table 1 we know that for a real discount rate of 3 percent, a fixed contribution 
rate of 18.7 percent of current salaries is sufficient to finance the PBO that comes to € 20.8 
billion in the deterministic case. Against this deterministic PBO and contribution rate, we 
benchmark our results for an environment in which investment returns are stochastic. In our 
base case, we will assume the same real discount rate of 3 percent and a penalty factor on 
supplementary contributions ξ of 20 percent. A following section will investigate into the 
impact of varying these assumptions. 
 Table 3 summarizes key findings for four distinct asset allocations, the three polar 
cases of 100 percent equities, 100 percent bonds, and 100 percent real estate investments as 
well as the optimal investment strategy, which is determined endogenously by minimizing the 
5%-CVaR of total pension costs. Panel 1 of Table 3 contains the portfolio weights of equities, 
bonds, and  real estate investments assuming a static asset allocation (Rows 1 to 3), the 
expected present value of total pension costs (Row 4), and the 5% Conditional Value at Risk 
(Row 5). Expectation and 5% Conditional Value at Risk of discounted supplementary 
contributions are shown in Panel 2 of Table 3 (Rows 6 and 7). Figure 2 provides closer insight 
into the dispersion of possible total pension cost outcomes for the four asset allocations under 
investigation, showing box plots of various percentiles of the overall cost distributions. 
Figure 2 and Table 3 here 
When the fund is fully invested in equities, total expected pension costs for active 
employees come to € 21.71 billion (Row 4, Column 1) while the 5%-CVaR amounts to 
€ 36.27 billion or about 75 percent higher than the deterministic PBO benchmark of € 20.8 
billion (Row 5, Column 1). In addition to the regular pension contributions of 18.7 percent of 
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the payroll, taxpayers face another expected € 8.69 billion in supplementary contributions, 
which rise to € 21.51 billion in CVaR (Rows 6 and 7, Column 1). As one would expect, high 
volatility of investment returns result in high dispersion of possible cost outcomes. From 
Figure 2 it can be seen that overall pension costs may vary widely from € 12.6 billion (5th 
percentile) to € 33 billion (95th percentile). Although high return volatility comes with high 
expected returns, expected pension costs are substantial due to the capped upside potential 
inherent in the plan design. While the plan manager is fully liable for funding deficits 
resulting from capital market losses, he is not able to recover excess funds in an effort to 
reduce overall pension costs. Thus, there is a strong disincentive for the plan manager to 
overinvest plan funds into equities. 
If, on the other hand, plan funds were fully invested in bonds, worst-case pension costs 
would only come to € 26.48 billion, while expected costs would even drop to € 18.62 billion 
(Rows 4 and 5, Column 2). Expected returns are moderate and therefore the cap on excess 
fund withdrawal is only of minor relevance. However, returns are still sufficient to earn some 
excess income over the discount rate, cutting expected costs down below their deterministic 
value. Lower volatility of investment returns results in lower dispersion of costs, ranging from 
€ 13.5 billion (5th percentile) to € 24.6 billion (95th percentile). This keeps worst-case pension 
costs under control. On average, only € 1.56 billion in supplementary contributions are 
required while their 5%-CVaR amounts to € 6.74 billion, less than one third compared to the 
all-equities allocation (Rows 6 and 7, Column 2).  
Column 3 of Table 3 presents the results for an investment strategy that allocates all 
plan funds to real estate, the least risky single asset class under consideration in this study. 
Consequently, with an overall amount of € 25.88 billion, worst-case pension costs are the 
lowest compared to the other polar cases (Row 5, Column 3). This also holds for expected and 
worst-case supplementary contributions, which come to € 1.42 billion and € 5.05 billion, 
respectively (Rows 6 and 7, Column 3). Low investment risk, however, comes at the cost of 
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low expected returns. Real estate investments hardly outperform the fixed discount rate. Thus, 
there is not much of a risk premium to cash in and the upside potential is heavily limited. 
Expected pension costs amount to € 21.99 billion, which exceeds those in the other polar 
cases as well as the deterministic PBO (Row 4, Column 3). 
The optimal investment strategy given the fixed contribution rate of 18.7 percent of 
salaries is depicted in Column 4 of Table 3. It consists of 22.3 percent equities, 47.2 percent 
bonds, and 30.5 percent real estate investments (Rows 1-3). Equities acquire a significant 
share in the optimal portfolio, indicating that current investment policy for the few funded 
German pension schemes, i.e. only investing in pure bond portfolios, might not be a favorable 
solution. Nonetheless, optimal equity weights are considerably lower than the almost 60 
percent reported for US state pension plans (Wilshire 2007). Allocating a substantial fraction 
of assets to real estate is in line with the results of Ziobrowski and Ziobrowski (1997) and 
Firstenberg, Ross, and Zisler (1988), among others. In a more recent study however, Craft 
(2001) argues that in an asset/liability framework allocations to private real estate investments 
should only range from 12 to 16 percent. This is more in line with empirical observations of 
real estate allocations varying between 5 and 10 percent (see e.g. Wilshire 2007, ABP 2007). 
To a certain extent, the relatively high allocation to real estate in this study may be attributed 
to the underlying pension plan design. Due to the pension plan’s up-side potential being 
restricted for political reasons, the plan manager will favor more stable real estate investments 
compared to riskier assets like equities. 
Given the optimal investment strategy, expected pension costs for active employees 
are reduced to only € 16.09 billion (Row 4, Column 4), more than 20 percent below the € 20.8 
billion required in the deterministic case. This cost reduction can directly be attributed to the 
considerable benefits, which can be expected from investing in diversified portfolios. From 
the outset, the fund is endowed with 18.7 percent of payroll, while actual pension payments 
are initially negligible. Expected returns well above the discount rate at which the benchmark 
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contribution rate was derived and moderate return volatilities enable the fund to quickly 
accumulate considerable assets. The possibility of being able to reduce the actual contribution 
rate increases through time, while the risk of having to make supplementary contributions to 
reduce funding deficits diminishes.  
This optimal funding and investment strategy also keeps worst-case risk under control. 
The 5% Conditional Value at Risk of total pension costs, or the expected cost in the five 
percent worst cases, only amounts to € 21.02 billion (Row 5, Column 4), almost equal to the 
deterministic benchmark.  Supplementary contributions are also low. Their present value only 
comes to € 500 million in expectation and even in the worst case – again defined as the five 
percent CVaR – they only amount to € 2.85 billion, slightly more than half the cost that was 
reported for the least risky pure real estate investment (Rows 6 and 7, Column 4).  
The benefit of diversification can also be seen in Figure 2 with pension costs for the 
optimal asset allocation ranging from € 12.5 billion (5th percentile) to € 20 billion (95th 
percentile). This range is smaller than for pure equity or bond investments, while investing 
only in real estate will result in an even smaller range. However, the overall level of costs 
resulting from following the optimal strategy is substantially lower compared to the pure real 
estate investment case. Only investing in real estate will result in the 5th percentile of overall 
costs being only marginally lower than the 95th percentile of costs in the optimal case. 
As a result, introducing an at least partially funded public pension plan that follows an 
optimized investment policy could be expected to substantially reduce the economic cost of 
providing covered pensions, while simultaneously keeping the consequences of capital market 
volatility under control. 
Figure 3 provides deeper insight into the temporal structure of risks and rewards of 
following the cost minimizing investment strategy (i.e. 22% stocks, 47% bonds, 30% real 
estate). Panel A depicts the time path of the probability of having to make supplementary 
contributions due to substantial underfunding resulting from unfavorable investment returns 
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(solid line). It indicates that there is a relatively low risk of additional contributions in the first 
decade of operations (much less than ten percent probability), and a negligible risk thereafter. 
The other two lines depict the probability of the regular contribution rate being reduced by 50 
(dashed line) or even 100 percent (dotted line). It can be seen that the probability of enjoying 
partial or full contribution holidays because of overfunding rises with time. Ten years into the 
program, the probability of a contribution holiday is only two percent, but 35 percent after 20 
years.  In other words, the risk of additional contributions is front-loaded, but the potential 
benefits savings are back-loaded.   
Figure 3 here 
Panel B of Figure 3 indicates that the expected value of required supplementary 
contributions (solid line) is highest at 12 years, where it amounts to € 40 million. The dotted 
line represents expected savings due to contribution holidays. Ten years after the program is 
launched, the expected savings amount to € 8.3 million, and rise to € 145 (578) million in year 
20 (40). The dashed line shows our estimate of the ‘worst case’ value of supplementary 
contributions measured by the 5%-CVaR risk metric. This suggests that, with a low 
probability, the plan sponsor might have to contribute substantially more during the early 
period: € 800 million at the 10 year mark, and € 360 million after 20 years. Reinforcing the 
message of Panel A, the optimal investment strategy greatly reduces the burden on future 
generations while controlling the risk on current contributors. 
Further Results. Naturally, the results derived so far depend heavily on model calibration. 
To check for robustness, we have analyzed optimal pension fund investment strategies for a 
selection of alternative parameterizations. While it is impossible to investigate all sensitivities, 
the findings presented below provide a good understanding of the basic interrelations. Results 
are summarized in Table 4 for three alternative parameter sets. For ease of comparison, 
Column 1 repeats the result derived above for our base case. Alternative 1 investigates the 
impact of the penalty factor on supplementary contributions by redoing the analysis using a 
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penalty factor for supplementary contributions of ξ=0 (Column 2). We then study the 
influence of expected asset returns on the optimal asset allocation (Column 3). To this end, we 
analyze the plan assuming a real discount rate of 1.5 percent (instead of the 3% in our base 
case) together with the low return scenario from Table 2.  Finally, we ease the restriction on 
withdrawing assets from the pension plan in an extremely overfunded situation by imposing a 
small cost on withdrawals.  Panel 1 of Table 4 presents optimal investment weights into 
equities, bonds, and real estate (Rows 1-3), as well as the expectation and the 5 percent CVaR 
of the present value of total pension costs (Rows 4 and 5). Rows 6 and 7 in Panel 2 again 
present the expectation and worst-case realization of the present value of supplementary 
contributions. Finally, Rows 8 and 9 present the expected value as well as the 5 percent CVaR 
of withdrawals from the pension plan. 
Table 4 here 
In our base case, we levy a penalty of 20 percent on supplementary contributions, 
giving plan managers an incentive to follow a sustainable investment policy, which only relies 
on extra payments as a last resort. Moreover, this penalty was introduced to support the notion 
that such payments do not come for free but rather involve some form of financing costs. If 
supplementary contributions were free of extra costs, the plan manager would engage in a 
more risky investment strategy. Under these circumstances, low risk real estate investments 
would be significantly reduced by more than 6 percentage points to an overall investment 
weight of 24.2 percent, while the weights of equities and bonds would both increase by about 
3 percent to 25.6 percent and 50.2 percent, respectively (Column 2, Rows 1 – 3). Equity 
exposure, however, continues to be comparably low, since the plan’s upside potential is still 
limited. Having to account for such a penalty increases overall pension costs. Hence, it comes 
at no surprise that reducing the penalty factor will automatically reduce plan costs. For a 
penalty factor of 0 percent, expected plan costs come to € 15.6 billion, while their worst-case 
value amounts to € 20.5 billion (Column 2, Rows 4 and 5). Both figures are about € 500 
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million below the ones reported for a penalty factor of 20 percent. Expected and worst-case 
supplementary contributions in Rows 6 and 7 of Column 2 are also lower than their 
counterparts in our base case (Column 1). Their decrease due to the reduced penalty factor, 
however, falls short of the 20 percent one might expect. This results from the slightly more 
aggressive optimal investment policy.  
Discounting pension liabilities with a reduced real rate of 1.5 percent increases the 
deterministic PBO to € 44.8 billion and the corresponding contribution rate to 30 percent of 
the payroll (Table 1, Column 2, Rows 2 and 3). Assuming that expected returns on assets drop 
by the same 1.5 percent, the optimal asset allocation will generate worst-case costs of € 44.79 
billion (Row 5 Column 3), virtually equal to the deterministic PBO. Expected pension costs 
come to € 33.65 billion, down 25 percent compared to their non-stochastic counterpart (Row 
4, Column 3). The optimal asset allocation consists of 22.5 percent equities, 47.5 percent 
bonds, and 30 percent real estate (Column 3, Rows 1-3). In essence, this equals the optimal 
allocation in our base case. The weight of real estate is marginally reduced by 0.5 percent, 
which are evenly distributed to equities and bonds. Thus, the interrelations between the asset 
classes as well as between plan assets and plan liabilities and the overall plan design 
determine optimal portfolio weights to a far greater extend than the absolute level of 
investment returns. 
Finally we allow the plan manager to almost completely participate in the upside 
potential of investing plan assets more aggressively into equities. This alternative permits the 
plan manager to recover assets that exceed liabilities by more than 80 percent.20 To prevent 
the manager from treating the pension as a hedge fund, we levy a 20 percent penalty on 
withdrawals. Now, investing in equities becomes much more appealing to the plan manager, 
as he is now rewarded for accepting higher return volatility with higher expected investment 
                                                 
20 Formally, we expand the total pension cost in Formula 2 to ∑ ⋅−−⋅++= ))()(( ttt WSCRCTPC 21 11 ξξ , 
where Wt are the withdrawals in the case of a funding ratio higher than 180 percent and ξ2 is the penalty factor. 
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returns. Equity weights in the optimal portfolio rise by more than 30 percentage points to 
about 53 percent (Row 1, Column 4). While bond holdings remain virtually constant, assets 
are no longer invested into real estate due to their lack of expected return (Column 4, Rows 2 
and 3). As expected investment returns significantly outperform the discount rate at which 
plan liabilities are valued, pension costs decrease substantially. In expectation, the plan 
exhibits negative pension costs of € 2.46 billion (Row 4, Column 4). This means that after 
initially paying contributions into the plan for some years, investment returns on accumulated 
plan funds are sufficient to finance ongoing pension payments and even allow withdrawals 
that exceed earlier contributions in present value terms. Withdrawals come to € 17.4 billion in 
expectation, and even in the worst case, almost € 3.5 billion can be withdrawn from the plan 
(Rows 8 and 9, Column 4). Worst-case risks in this scenario are also well under control. 
While worst-case supplementary contributions come to € 6.71 billion, more than double the 
amount of the base case (Row 7, Columns 1 and 4), and the five percent CVaR of total 
pension only amounts to € 16 billion, 20 percent less than the deterministic pension cost (Row 
5, Column 4). 
 
Conclusions 
As in many countries, civil servants in Germany are promised an unfunded defined 
benefit pension. These benefits represent a significant liability to taxpayers, one which is 
currently not recognized as explicit state debt. We analyze the implications of moving Hesse’s 
civil servants pension plan toward funding. We focus only on future benefit accruals, 
assuming that pensions paid to current retirees as well as claims already accumulated by 
active civil servants will be financed from other sources. With a non-stochastic framework 
based on a real discount rate of three percent, the annual contribution rate would be around 19 
percent of salary which would be sufficient to cover future benefit accruals. Drawing on these 
results, we scrutinize alternative asset allocation strategies within a stochastic asset/liability 
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framework. Here, we seek to minimize the worst-case costs of providing the promised 
pensions. In our base case, we find that, given the contribution rate of about 19 percent, the 
optimal investment policy for pension plan assets comprises 22 percent equities, 47 percent 
bonds, and about 31 percent real estate investments. Following this funding and investment 
policy will curtail worst-case pension costs to the deterministic PBO, while expected costs fall 
below these by almost 25 percent. 
These results indicate that moving toward a funded pension system for German civil 
servants could be beneficial to both taxpayers as well as employees. Taxpayers can expect 
substantial cost reductions due to the favorable impact of earning investment returns in the 
capital markets, while their exposure to investment risks is limited for reasonable investment 
policies. Civil servants, in turn, benefit from being less exposed to discretionary pension cuts 
in times of tight government’s budgets. Additionally, they might enjoy greater flexibility as 
pension claims backed by assets are much more portable than unfunded promises. Finally, we 
argue that public plans that hold 60 percent or more in equities, as is true in the US public 
case, is likely too aggressive. Nevertheless, investing in pure bond portfolios as in the few 
German pension schemes that hold some assets provides stability, but can be quite expensive. 
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Table 1: Projected Benefit Liabilities and Contribution Rates: Deterministic Model 
   Discount Rate 
   3% 1.5% 
   (1) (2) 
     
(1) PV Pension Liabilities (in € bn)  20.8 44.8 
(2) PV Future Salaries (in € bn)  111.5 149.3 
(3) Contribution Rate: (1) / (2) (in %)  18.7 30.0 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using data provided by the State of Hesse for 2004. Base case defined with a 3% 
discount rate, alternative case uses 1.5%. 
Source: Derived from Maurer, Mitchell and Rogalla (2008). 
 
 
 
Table 2: Simulated Parameters for Stochastic Asset Case 
         
  Expected Returns    Correlations 
  Base case 
scenario 
Low return 
scenario  
Standard 
deviations  Equities Bonds 
Real 
Estate 
          
Equities  6.57% 5.07%  23.4%  1   
Bonds  4.08% 2.58%  7.02%  0.17 1  
Real Estate  3.13% 1.63%  3.80%*  0.09 -0.52 1 
Notes: *: Unsmoothed volatility following Blundell and Ward (1987). Base case scenario relates to a discount 
rate of 3%, low return scenario relates to a discount rate of 1.5%. See the Appendix for estimated quarterly VAR 
parameters which generate these moments based on 10,000 simulations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Risk of Alternative Asset Allocation Patterns, Assuming Fixed Contribution 
Rate 
 Fixed contribution rate: 18.7%  
 Deterministic PBO: € 20.8 bn  
100% 
Equities 
100% 
Bonds 
100% 
Real Estate 
Cost min. 
Asset Mix 
 Real Discount Rate: 3%  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
 Panel 1      
(1) Equity Weight (%)  100 0 0 22.3 
(2) Bond Weight (%)  0 100 0 47.2 
(3) Real Estate Weight (%)  0 0 100 30.5 
(4) Expected Pension Costs (€ bn)  21.71 18.62 21.99 16.09 
(5) 5%-CVaR Pension Costs (€ bn)  36.27 26.48 25.88 21.02 
       
 Panel 2      
(6) Exp. Suppl. Contributions (€ bn)  8.69 1.56 1.43 0.50 
(7) 5%-CVaR Suppl. Contrib. (€ bn)  21.51 6.74 5.05 2.85 
 
Notes: Contribution rate in % of salaries. Supplementary contributions required in case of funding ratio (i.e. 
fund assets/PBO) below 90% to restore funding ratio of 100%. Contribution rate reduced by 50% (100%) in 
case of funding ratio above 120% (150%). Opportunity costs of supplementary contributions addressed by 
accounting for a penalty of ξ = 20%.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using data provided by the State of Hesse. 
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Table 4: Optimal Asset Allocation Patterns for Alternative Parameterizations 
    
Base 
Case 
 
Alternative 
1 
 
Alternative 
2 
 
Alternative 
3 
 Fixed contribution rate (in %)  18.7 18.7 30 18.7 
 Deterministic PBO (in € bn)  20.8 20.8 44.8 20.8 
 Real Discount Rate (in %)  3.0 3.0 1.5 3.0 
 Penalty Factor on Suppl. 
Contributions 
 
0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 
 Penalty Factor on Withdrawals  - - - 0.2 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
 Panel 1      
(1) Equity Weight (%)  22.3 25.6 22.5 53.1 
(2) Bond Weight (%)  47.2 50.2 47.5 46.9 
(3) Real Estate Weight (%)  30.5 24.2 30.0 0.0 
(4) Expected Pension Costs (€ bn)  16.09 15.56 33.65 -2.46 
(5) 5%-CVaR Pension Costs (€ bn)  21.02 20.54 44.79 16.02 
       
 Panel 2      
(6) Exp. Suppl. Contributions (€ bn)  0.50 0.49 0.59 1.68 
(7) 5%-CVaR Suppl. Contrib. (€ bn)  2.85 2.63 4.79 6.71 
(8) Exp. Withdrawals (€ bn)  0.00 0.00 0.00 17.37 
(9) 5%-CVaR Withdrawals (€ bn)  0.00 0.00 0.00 3.42 
 
Notes: Contribution rate in % of salaries. Supplementary contributions required in case of funding ratio (i.e. 
fund assets/PBO) below 90% to restore funding ratio of 100%. Contribution rate reduced by 50% (100%) in 
case of funding ratio above 120% (150%). Withdrawal of funds exceeding 180% of pension liabilities (subject 
to respective penalty factor). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data provided by the State of Hesse. 
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Appendix:  Quarterly VAR Parameters 
 rm,t xe,t xb,t dpt sprt rnom,t 
       
Parameter estimates 
rm,t+1 -0.0338 0.0035 -0.0226 -0.2118 -0.0350 0.5455 
xe,t+1 0.1267 0.0116 0.0920 1.9727 0.5572 -2.8218 
xb,t+1 -0.1710 -0.0176 0.1106 -0.3946 0.9146 1.5958 
dpt+1 -0.0099 0.0012 -0.0094 0.9274 -0.0169 0.0464 
sprt+1 0.0467 0.0005 0.0458 -0.0196 0.9729 0.3110 
rnom,t+1 -0.0268 0.0010 -0.0173 0.0434 -0.0869 0.7718 
D0 -0.1218  -0.0068  -0.2699  -0.3993  -0.2348  -0.5134 
D1 -0.0915 -0.0073 -0.0033 0.1551    0.3570 0.3802 
       
Error correlation matrix 
rm,t 0.54      
xe,t -0.05 11.55     
xb,t 0.19 -0.07 3.00    
dpt 0.06 -0.87 0.12 0.30   
sprt 0.01 0.05 -0.42 -0.10 0.62  
rnom,t 0.21 -0.16 0.12 0.23 -0.35 0.15 
       
H -0.4897      
σre 0.0065      
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 1: Age Distribution of Active Civil Servants in 2004 
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Notes: Age distribution for all active civil servants, N = 104,919. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data provided by the State of Hesse for 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Range of Pension Costs under Alternative Asset Allocations 
 
 
Notes: Total Pension Costs defined as net of Regular and Supplementary Contributions using 3% discount rate. 
Annotations refer to the respective percentiles of total pension cost distributions for various asset allocations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 3: Time Paths of Supplementary Public Pension Contributions and Cost Savings under Optimal 
Asset Allocation Strategy 
 
A. Probabilities of Supplementary Contributions and Contribution Holidays Over Time 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Year
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
P(SC) P(CR=50%) P(CR=0%)
 
B. Magnitudes (in € 2004) of Expected Supplementary Contributions and Cost Saving due to Contribution 
Holidays 
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Notes: P(SC): probability of supplementary contributions being required in any period. 
P(CR=50%)/P(CR=0%): probability of regular contribution rate being reduced to 50%/0%. Exp. SC: expected 
value of supplementary contributions in any given period. 5%-CVaR SC: “worst case” value of supplementary 
contributions in any given period. Exp. Savings: expected value of cost savings due to cuts in contribution rates 
in any given period. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
